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BENCH AND BAR
DISTRICT COURT DIGESTS
INSURANCE - CONSTRUCTION OF "COLLISION" AND "PROTECTION OF
AUTOMOBILE" CLAUSES. Jones v. Sunshine Mutual Insurance Co.,
District Court of The Fifth Judicial District, Williams County,
North Dakota, Eugene A. Burdick, Judge.
This was an action brought by the insured against the insurer to
recover on the "Collision or Upset" provisions of a National Stand-
ard combination automobile insurance policy which provided:
under coverage E, ". . . to pay for direct and accidental loss of or
damage to the automobile,. . . caused by collision with another ob-
ject or by upset . . . in excess of the deductible amount . . ."; and
which provided under "Conditions"., ". . . when loss occurs, the
named insured shall protect the automobile, . . . and any further
loss due to the named insured's failure to protect shall not be
recoverable... "
The facts disclosed that plaintiff's wife had driven the insured
automobile to an outdoor movie theatre near Williston. At the con-
clusion of the performance she proceeded forward over the ramp,
and she noticed that the bottom of the car scraped against the
ramp, but thought nothing unusual about it. She proceeded into
the city, to meet her husband at the VFW before returning to their
residence in the city. Subsequently, while enroute home, and yet
six blocks from it with the insured himself probably operating the
vehicle, the car stopped, apparently by reason of the "freezing" of
the engine caused by lack of oil. It was discovered that the drain
plug in the oil pan of the engine had been knocked off when the
engine had scraped the ramp at the theatre. The ruined engine
was replaced, and damages were stipulated at replacement cost
of $340.56 less $58.43 depreciation, less the $50 deductible. It was
also stipulated that the engine would not have been damaged be-
yond the immediate damage to the drain plug and oil pan had the
engine been shut off immediately after the oil plug was knocked
loose.
The court decided that the damages were the proximate result
of the collision of the drain plug with the ramp, that it was a loss
within the meaning of the collision provisions of the policy, and
that defendant had not met the burden of showing that the insured
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had failed to exercise due care to protect the automobile after the
loss had occurred.
The decision emphasized the fact that the insured's wife had
only six months driving experience and was relatively unfamiliar
with the undergear, oil pressure, and pressure gauge of the auto-
mobile when it considered whether due care had been used to
protect the automobile after the loss.
There being no North Dakota cases in point, the court, relied
upon the following cases to sustain its position: Haik v. United
States Fidelity and Guarantee Co., 130 So. 118 (La App.); Run-
ner v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 76 S.E.2d 244 (W. Va. 1935);
Padgett v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 77 S.E.2d 219 (S. C. 1953):
Womack v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 68 So.2d 661 (La. App.
1953); and distinguished Calvert Fire Insurance Co. v. Robinson
266 S.W.2d 326 (Ky. 1954), (Recovery denied where the insured
knew that the rock had collided with the undercarriage and made
no effort to ascertain the damage, ignoring the oil pressure and
motor temperature knowing that vital parts of the engine may
have been affected.)
OIL AND GAS- LEASE CONVEYS RIGHTS ONLY TO SPECIFIED MIN-
ERALS - MacMaster v. Onstad. District Court of the Fifth
Judicial District, Williams County, North Dakota, Eugene A.
Burdick, District Judge.
This was an action to quiet title to real property. The question
was whether an instrument entitled "Oil and Gas Lease" being on a
form labeled "North Dakota Producer's 88 Spec." included not only
oil, gas, casinghead gas, casinghead gasoline, and associated fluid
hydrocarbons, but also rights to uranium and all other minerals
which might be thereafter found and produced from the leased
premses
The court held that in construing this lease from its four corners
and applying the rule of ejusdem generis, the lease in controversy
covered only sulphur, by specific mention, and oil, gas, casinghead
gas, casinghead gasoline, and such associated hydrocarbons, fluid
in character, as are, or can be produced in connection with, and as
an incident of the production of oil and through the means of a
well. All other minerals and substances, such as coal, gravel and
uranium which customarily are or can be produced commercially
only through the process of mining, whether by removal of over-
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burden, by shaft, or by tunnel, were not within the contemplation
of the parties, and are excluded from the scope of the lease in
controversy.
The court reached its decision by analogy from the case of
Harney v. Wirtz, 30 N. D. 292, 512 N.W. 803. In that case the
court in construing an instrument considered the name that the
parties had chosen to give the instrument, its appearance, and the
general nature, tenor and purport thereof. From a consideration of
these factors, the court found that the instrument under consid-
eration was a chattel mortgage, and did not constitute a lien upon
certain real property, although the instrument contained an express
provision as follows:
"... this mortgage is a charge and lien on said real estate
until said debt hereby secured is paid, and said lien may be
foreclosed in the same manner as other mortgages on real
estate."
The court expressly refused to decide whether or not extrinsic
evidence may be entered to establish the intent of the parties, for
it found that no patent ambiguity existed.
The court also noted in its decision that a contrary result has
been reached on similar facts by the Federal District Court, District
of North Dakota, S.W. Division, in the case of Evangelical Luth-
eran Church v. Standard Oil and Gas Company, Civil No. 3208,
but indicated that since no memorandum decision had been filed
the reasoning employed by the Federal court could not be
analyzed.
A Texas Case was also noted in the court's decision which con-
sidered the intent of the parties in determining whether the lan-
guage "all the oil, gas and other minerals" was broad enough to
include commercial gravel, and from a consideration of this intent,
it was concluded that gravel was not within the terms of the lease.
Praeletorian Diamond Oil Ass'n. v. Garvey, 15 S.W.2d 698 (Tex.
Civ. App.).
REAL PROPERTY - RESERVATION OF MINERALS IN CONTRACT OF SALE
DoES NOT INCLUDE GRAVEL. - Salzseider v. Brunsdale, District
Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Burleigh County, North
Dakota, C. L. Foster, Judge.
This was an action for a declaratory judgment construing Sec-
tion 38-0901 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 which re-
.served to the State ". . . fifty percent of all oil, natural gas, or
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minerals which may be found on. or underlying . . . public lands
sold by the State."
The plaintiff had entered into a contract for the purchase of
certain school lands from the State. While the contract of purchase
was in good standing the plaintiff entered into a contract for the
sale of gravel located on the premises for use in the construction of
a stretch of highway being built nearby. The plaintiff contended
that the statutory reservation of ". . . fifty percent of all . . . min-
erals . . . found on or underlying . . ." the land did not include
a reservation of rights to commercial gravel deposits.
The State contended that the term "minerals" as used in the
statute included gravel, which the evidence showed was located
on the land underlying approximately six to eight inches of top-
soil, which soil was su itable for cultivation and from which gravel
could not be removed without destroying the surface for agricul-
tural purposes. Plaintiff contended that the gravel was a part of
the soil and was not reserved by the State.
The court held, "that the act of the legislature creating the res-
ervation of fifty percent of oil, gas, or minerals in lands sold by the
State was not intended to and does not include ordinary gravel
beds which cannot be operated or used without the destruction of
the surface; that such gravel is a part of the soil and not a mineral
within the meaning of that term as commonly used; that it was
not the intent of the legislature to reserve anything except per-
haps subsurface materials; and that the defendant is not entitled
to receive fifty percent of the gravel sold from the land herein."
The court cites 31 AJ 301, Section 29 as being persuasive: "But
if the grantor intends to get minerals in such a way as will destroy
the surface, he should frame the reservation in such a way as to
show the intention clearly." The learned judge points out that just
as in the case of a grantor, the State, if it wished to reserve the
gravel on the property to the possible destruction of the surface,
it should have specifically done so by appropriate wording in the
statute. The court states that "The weight of authority seems to be
that what are called minerals are such substances as are generally
understood by people working with, dealing or handling the same
ia the particular area, and the Court believes that judicial notice
can be taken that in North Dakota farmers and others do not
think of or call gravel a mineral."
The court relied upon the following cases to sustain its position:
Steinman Development Co. v. W. Al. Ritter Lumber Co., 290 Fed.
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832; Kinder v. La Salle County Carbon Coal Co., 311 Ill. 126, 141
N.E. 537; Carson v. Missouri Pacific R. R., 212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d
97; Heinatz v. Allen, 217 S.W.2d 994; Hendler v. Lehigh Valley
Ry., 209 Pa. 256, 59 At. 486.
REAL PROPERTY - TAX TITLE NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTE
Is INVALID. - Thompson v. Goldwood, District Court, Fifth Judi-
cial District, McKenzie County, North Dakota, Eugene Burdick,
Judge.
This was an action to quiet title. The Middlewest Securities
Company became the owner of the lands in dispute in 1920 by
means of a sheriff's deed which was validly recorded. In 1927 Mc-
Kenzie County acquired title to the property through tax title pro-
ceedings, and on Oct. 7, 1930 executed a purported contract for
deed to one Sherven by which the purchase price was to be paid in
three installments. The first installment was paid, but no further
payment was made nor were real estate taxes paid for the years
1931 through 1935. In 1937 Sherven executed several assignments of
royalty to the defendants, all of which were filed for record. In the
years 1937 and 1938 the county instituted another tax title proceed-
ing against the lands involved which resulted in the title returning
to the county in 1940. Thereafter, the land was conveyed by the
county to the plaintiff.
The court held for the plaintiff on the ground that Sherven never
had a valid title to the land in dispute and he could therefore pass
no interest in such property. The purported contract between
Sherven and the county not having been fully performed by the
vendee, remained executory in character. The conveyance of a
royalty interest in the production of oil and gas from the lands
covered by this purported contract for deed would necessarily
constitute an assignment of a portion of the equitable estate which
the instrument attempted to transfer to Sherven. It is elementary
that an assignee of an equitable interest in land can acquire no
greater interest than his assignor, so if the contract for deed is in-
valid for any reason then the purported assignments of royalty to
the defendants must likewise be void.
The statute dealing with tax title proceedings, in effect at that
time, required that each parcel of land should be sold to the
highest cash bidder. (Laws 1927, Chapter 266, amending and re-
tnacting Section 2202 of the 1925 supplement to the Compiled
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Laws of 1913). It is obvious that the statute controls and neither
the county nor its auditor can deviate from its requirements and
in so doing make a valid contract. The purchaser at a sale of land-
sold pursuant to the statute, must take notice of its terms. (Deckter
v. Sheridan County, 72 N. D. 607, 10 N.W.2d 485; Rommick v.
Wagner, 77 N. D. 120, 41 N.W.2d 170). It has been further held
that where there is a specific statute which prescribes the manner
of sale of property acquired by a county by tax title proceedings,
such statute is controlling and a sale not made in conformity with
such statute is void. (See Dazey v. Barnes County, 70 N. D. 752,
298 N.W. 13).
The purported contract for deed to Sherven being void, no
interest in the land in controversy was assigned to the defendants,
consequently, the defendants were not at any time persons who
were entitled to redeem from the tax sale.
The defendants contended that the 1940 tax title was void be-
cause the county auditor failed to serve the notice of expiration of
the period of redemption upon them or their predecessors at a time
when such interests were shown of record in the office of the
register of deeds. Court deemed it unnecessary to consider this
contention in the light of the provision in the purported contract for
deed which specified "that no sale, transfer, assignment or pledge
of this contract, or any interest therein or of or in the premises
therein described shall be in any manner binding on the seller un-
less said seller shall first consent thereto by writing endorsed
hereon."
DIGESTS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS
COUNTY OFFICIALS - DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF
Opinion of October 5, 1956
County board chairman and county auditors are justified in re-
fusing to sign contracts and to release funds approved by a majority
of the board of county commissioners where the chairman and
auditor are officially advised by the states attorney that the appro-
priations may be held to be illegal.
County board chairman and auditor may be held personally
liable for moneys released or obligations assumed where they have
been officially advised by the states attorney that such release or
assumption may be illegal.
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